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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an every-day grocery shopper entering a store. This consumer cares about where products come from and about what goes into a
product. For example, this consumer wants to avoid genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) because of health concerns and environmental impact.
Walking through the aisles to pick basic products such as cereal, canned
corn or beans, this consumer takes a quick look at the label to find the
information he or she needs. The only information available on the labels
is a Quick Response Code (QR code),1 for which the consumer needs a
smartphone. There are many reasons why this consumer might give up on
using the QR code: being in a hurry, not being able to afford a smartphone,
poor cell service, or lack of technological knowledge. The results are the
same: use of the QR code to designate the presence of GMOs effectively
deprives the consumer of the right to choose GMO-free food. This unappealing result is essentially the consequence of the new federal GMO labeling law. Investors experience similar difficulties when trying to identify
opportunities with companies that claim to have adopted sustainable practices. The lack of enforcement of climate risk disclosures from the Security
Exchange Commission (SEC) and attacks from big industry lobbies on
other types of disclosure requirements deprive consumers and investors of
the power to encourage sustainable practices.
The concept of sustainability has become increasingly important over
the last couple of decades. Governments around the world struggle to en-

1
QR codes are high capacity encodings of data that can be printed out in small sizes on packages
and labels that users can scan with the use of a smart phone to access a Web page containing more
information about the product. See QRCode.com, What is a QR Code?, https://perma.cc/R4DDEGRB.

66

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 8:1

hance economic growth while minimizing the negative impacts on the environment and providing humane working conditions for a growing population.2 Defining the term “sustainability” itself has proven difficult, centering on the idea of promoting economic development in a way that will
benefit present and future generations without detrimentally affecting the
resources of the planet.3 Sustainability law presents political and legal
challenges that environmentalists have not yet been able to solve efficiently.4 An increasing number of scholars have recognized that the traditional “command and control” environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s
and 1980s have failed to adapt to the 21st century.5 In order to provide
efficient protection to our environment, we must shift our focus toward a
policy based on sound science, careful cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment, and greater transparency.6 Consumers and investors play a central role in this sustainability-based framework by choosing products and
investment opportunities that promote sustainable practices. In turn, this
will encourage businesses to enter the market to supply such products, potentially bringing down their cost. However, consumers and investors currently lack the crucial information they need to be able to make informed
choices regarding sustainability, such as: the raw materials going into a
product, the labor practices of the producer, or the carbon intensity of the
product.
Recent developments regarding disclosure requirements imposed on
companies seem to reflect the will to provide consumers and investors with
more information regarding the products they purchase. However, these

2
See David R. Boyd, Sustainability Law, Respecting the Laws of Nature, MCGILL INT’L REV.
57 (2005) (depicting a pessimistic image of human activity’s impact on our planet, arguing that the
Earth’s ozone layer was badly damaged in the past century, that forests, grasslands, coral reefs and
other ecosystems have been destroyed or damaged, and that the majority of the world’s fisheries are
in decline).
3
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) declares that “[s]ustainability is based on a
simple principle: Everything that we need for our survival and well-being depends, either directly or
indirectly, on our natural environment. To pursue sustainability is to create and maintain the conditions
under which humans and nature can exist in productive harmony to support present and future generations.” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Lean About Sustainability, https://perma.cc/J29MNXZN . Oregon defines “sustainability “as “using, developing and protecting resources in a manner
that enables people to meet current needs and provides that future generations can also meet future
needs, from the joint perspective of environmental, economic and community objectives.” OR. REV.
STAT.§184.421 (2015).
4
See generally John C. Dernbach & Joel A. Mintz, Environmental Laws and Sustainability: An
Introduction, 3 SUSTAINABILITY 531 (2011).
5
Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 117–
20 (2004).
6
Daniel C. Esty and Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Sustainability and Competitiveness: Policy Imperative and Corporate Opportunity 1, (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper).
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developments have proven largely ineffective.7 One of these developments, the 2016 GMO labeling law, reflects a bi-partisan compromise, but
has encountered mixed feelings from consumers. 8 In addition, the SEC
issued guidelines indicating how public companies should report climate
risks in yearly reports; however, this requirement has remained largely unenforced since the first two years after its promulgation, and has little influence today.9 A third attempt to compel disclosure of “non-sustainable”
practices came with the Dodd-Frank Act’s10 provisions addressing conflict
minerals-which require all companies to report the use of conflict minerals
in their supply chain.11 These mandated disclosures are all part of a broader
effort to develop sustainability law by adopting a similar scheme: empowering consumers and investors to have a positive impact on decision-making with regard to sustainability issues.
Although the GMO law, the SEC-mandated climate risk disclosures,
and regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act take an important first step toward developing a sustainable economy, all of these legislations implicate
First Amendment issues in one way or another. Opponents of these developments, often lobbyists and industries, argue that compelling companies
to disclose factually true information related to products and corporate
practices constitutes a violation of the Constitution. Specifically, they argue that such requirements intrude upon freedom of speech, a fundamental
right that has always been championed in the United States. These examples do not implicate traditional freedom of speech issues; rather, these
laws fall into the specific category of compelled commercial free speech,
according them a different level of constitutional protection under Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 12
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding compelled commercial
speech makes it difficult to legislate in this area, as the Court applies different tests for different categories of regulations affecting commercial
speech. Following Central Hudson, the courts have generally subjected
regulations on commercial speech to a level of heightened scrutiny, but, in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,13 the Supreme Court applied
7

See infra § II(C).
See Andrea Hayley, Organic Industry at Odds Over National GMO Labeling Bill, EPOCH
TIMES (July 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/PA63-YZ92. Despite the criticism, the new law still marks a
step towards the right direction. See Mark Bittman, G.M.O. Labeling Law Could Stir a Revolution,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2016, at A19.
9
See David Gelles, When Investors Aren’t Told About Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2016, at BU7.
10
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
11
Id. at §§1502-1504; Conflict Minerals, 77 FR 56273 (Sept. 12, 2012).
12
447 U.S. 557 (1980). See infra §III.
13
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
8

68

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 8:1

a lower “rational basis” scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of a
government regulation compelling commercial speech when the governmental interest at stake was “preventing deception of consumers.”14 However, recent jurisprudential developments have blurred this distinction,
leaving uncertainty as to what standard must be met by regulations compelling disclosure.15
This article aims at providing a guide towards rehabilitation of compelled disclosure legislation by arguing that the Supreme Court should address and resolve the confusion around the scope of Zauderer by adopting
a rational basis test for compelled commercial speech regulations.16 The
current state of compelled speech jurisprudence limits the government’s
ability to promote sustainability, thus preventing consumers from accessing information necessary to make more sustainable choices. This status
quo essentially allows industry lobbies to conceal valuable information
from the public. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reassess the Zauderer test to send the important message that companies will not be allowed to use the First Amendment as a shield against consumers and investors’ requests for more transparency. By adopting a clear standard governing compelled commercial speech, the Supreme Court could indirectly
empower consumers and investors to choose a more sustainable future.
Additional information would allow consumers and investors to choose
products based on their impact on the environment, local communities,
and other sustainability-related data.
This article analyzes the legal difficulties in trying to better inform
consumers and investors, particularly as applied against freedom of speech
in the commercial setting. Part II analyzes recent legal developments
14
Id. at 651. Under the rational basis standard, a regulation compelling commercial speech will
not run afoul of the First Amendment if there is a rational connection between the warnings’ legitimate
purpose and means used to achieve that purpose. Id. However, the Supreme Court has only applied
Zauderer in one other case also involving misleading advertising. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz,
P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
15
For example, The D.C. Circuit, in a 2014 decision reviewing a government regulation forcing
companies to list on the labels of their meat cuts the country of origin of the animal, held that “Zauderer in fact does reach beyond problems of deception, sufficiently to encompass the disclosure at
issue here.” Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter
AMI]. The AMI decision turned out to be particularly important in the context of disclosure requirements addressed in this article, as the decision also overruled the first holding of the D.C. Circuit
striking down the provisions of the Conflict Minerals rule under the Central Hudson test. Nat’l Ass’n
of Mfgs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter NAM I]. On rehearing, the D.C. Circuit
affirmed its initial decision on a different basis. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfgs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) [hereinafter NAM II]. Still, these three D.C. Circuit opinions do highlight the confusion
surrounding the reach of the Zauderer decision.
16
It is of note that at least one other scholar has argued that regulations that compel commercial
speech should have to clear the same constitutional test as restrictions on commercial speech. See
Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ L.
REV. 421 (2016); But see infra §V(A).
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aimed at informing consumers and investors, describing the controversies
surrounding the SEC climate risks disclosures, the Dodd-Frank Act’s conflict minerals provisions, and GMO labeling requirements. Part III provides a summary of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with regard to
commercial speech and compelled speech, and also addresses the latest
cases scrutinizing mandated disclosures. Part IV explains why disclosure
requirements are integral in empowering investors and consumers to
choose a sustainable future. Part V analyzes and rejects the argument that
the mandated disclosures discussed here violate free speech protections.
Part VI then argues that the Supreme Court should address and clarify the
test applied to compelled commercial speech by adopting a more permissive test for the government. The article concludes that labeling requirements and mandated climate risks disclosures are not only consistent with
the Constitution; but are also fundamentally important as tools to educate
consumers and investors about the impact of their choices on the development of a sustainable economy.
II. BACKGROUND
For consumers and investors to make further strides towards a more
sustainable economy, they need information enabling them to choose between products which were manufactured using environmentally-conscious processes that accounted for environmental or human harm as opposed to products manufactured with little concern for such impacts. Recent legal developments have tried to remedy the lack of information for
consumers and investors in different sectors of our economy. The SECmandated climate risk disclosures, the Dodd-Frank Act conflict minerals
disclosures, and most recently, the emergence of GMO labeling laws are
all evidence of the effort to provide consumers with more information.
This section analyzes these recent developments to highlight their
strengths and flaws.
A. SEC Climate Risk Disclosures
In 2010, the SEC issued guidelines encouraging companies to report
serious climate risks that could potentially harm their profits.17 This information, along with other substantial events relating to business activities
such as lawsuits, financial performance, and business trends, is compiled
in annual reports known as 10-Ks, which are available to investors. Many
17

See Benjamin Hulac, Inside the Mirage of Good Climate Info at the SEC, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug.
11, 2016), https://perma.cc/597C-FNHF. Then-SEC chairwoman Mary Schapiro warned that “[w]e
are not opining on whether the world’s climate is changing, at what pace it might be changing, or due
to what causes.” Id. The guidelines basically served as a reminder the companies have an obligation
to disclose all “material” information to investors.
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investors, convinced that climate effects, such as rising sea levels and extreme weather, harmed their financial returns, originally welcomed the
new guidelines. In the past, the SEC enforced these guidelines, asking
companies to explain in greater detail how climate change-related issues
affected their business.18 However, these practices were short-lived and
eventually stopped under the current chairwoman.19
The agency has since faced growing criticism for its lack of enforcement of climate risk disclosures.20 Studies of U.S. public companies listed
on major stock exchanges showed that only 27 percent of about 4,000 total
companies even mentioned the words “climate change” or “global warming” in their filings.21 The fact that so many companies failed to mention
these terms shows a deficiency with regard to the SEC’s enforcement
power, which stems from the voluntary nature of the disclosures.22 However, mandatory climate risk disclosure would surely draw strong opposition from industry lobbies. These lobbyists generally argue that requiring
disclosure of facts that companies would not otherwise elect to disclose is
“compelled speech,” and thus a violation of the First amendment.23 Even
in their current state, the voluntary disclosures are facing attacks from a
majority Republican Congress.24 Congressman Bill Posey introduced legislation to block SEC reporting guidance on climate change risks for publicly traded companies, as he also did in 2010 and 2012,25 arguing that the
uncertainty of the science of climate change defeated the need for such a
guidance.26 Opponents of the guidance also argue that the number of climate risk disclosures have failed to improve since the guidance was enacted in 2010 and that the quality of disclosure was poor.27 However, the
flaws of the guidance seem to come from the fact that the SEC has no real
18

See id.
Id.
20
See David Gelles, S.E.C. Is Criticized for Lax Enforcement of Climate Risk Disclosure, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2016, at BU7; Robert Repetto, It’s Time the SEC Enforced its Climate Disclosure
Rules, IISD, (Mar. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/LA2H-5XUC .
21
Zahra Hirji, Most U.S. Companies Ignoring SEC Rule to Disclose Climate Risks, INSIDE
CLIMATE NEWS, Sept. 19, 2013, https://perma.cc/9BKG-F22T.
22
Gelles, supra note 20.
23
When the Conflict Minerals Rule was held unconstitutional, some scholars expressed concern
that few disclosure requirements would survive First Amendment scrutiny and that companies’ free
speech would always trump disclosure obligations. Dynda A. Thomas, SEC Conflict Minerals Rule
Legal Challenge is Over – But Not For Good, CONFLICT MINERALS LAW (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://perma.cc/KT8T-DT5W.
24
Mindy Lubber, SEC Climate Risk Disclosure Effort Under Serious Attack from Congress,
FORBES (July 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/FNQ6-Y8ME.
25
Id.
26
Hiroko Tabuchi, Clifford Kraus, A New Debate Over Pricing the Risks of Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2016, at B1.
27
See GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SEC CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
GUIDANCE: AN OVERVIEW AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS 4-5 (2013).
19
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enforcement tools, rather than because of the uncertainty of climate
change.
While the SEC’s climate risk disclosures are far from perfect in their
current state, they could become an important tool to provide investors
with the information necessary to make sustainable choices. The SEC received strong support for more detailed and stricter disclosure requirements, with dozens of institutional investors submitting letters to the federal agency in 2016.28 The letters requested quick action to “require
stronger reporting of sustainability risks such as climate change, water
scarcity and global forestation.”29 The SEC should act toward this goal in
order to fulfill its mission of ensuring that publicly traded companies provide investors with the necessary information material to make meaningful
choices.30 Such information is not easily available, and it is the SEC’s responsibility to facilitate investors’ access to it.
B. Conflict Minerals Disclosure
The SEC was also at the center of a controversial sustainability-related provision when it enacted the final rule implementing Section 1502
of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act requires companies using gold, tin, tungsten, and tantalum to determine whether the minerals came from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or adjoining countries similarly plagued
by conflicts.31 If so, companies must carry out a “due diligence” review of
their supply chain to assess whether they are funding armed groups by
purchasing these minerals.32 The SEC issued the final rule implementing
Section 1502 in August 2012, requiring companies to report publicly on
their due diligence starting in 2013, and mandating independent audits on
the reports.33
Compared to the SEC climate risk disclosures, the Conflict Minerals
rule created a stronger enforcement mechanism. The rule calls for civil

28
Peyton Fleming, In Unprecedented Response, Investors Call On SEC To Improve Reporting
Of Climate Risks And Other Sustainability Challenges, CERES (July 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/P94SKVYG.
29
Id.
30
Lubber, supra note 24.
31
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1502 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. Ch 2B) (2010).
32
Implementation of US Dodd-Frank Act Rule on Conflict Minerals: Commentaries, Guidance,
Company Actions, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, https://perma.cc/AVA2-RTG4.
Due diligence measures must conform to a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence
framework, for example as approved by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). See Fact Sheet, Disclosing the use of Conflict Minerals, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/N55Q-DV52.
33
Conflict Minerals, 77 FR 56273 (Sept. 12, 2012).
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penalties for companies knowingly making a false or misleading statement. Companies also face pressure from human rights activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and consumers to show that minerals
used in the supply chain are conflict-free.34 The rule rapidly came under
attack in the D.C. Circuit,35 and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
recently affirmed a lower court judgment holding that the Conflict Minerals Rule was unconstitutional.36 Specifically, the Court held that the requirement to report minerals as having “not been found to be DRC conflict
Free”37 violated the First Amendment by compelling companies to disclose information they would not otherwise elect to disclose. Although the
Court accepted the premise that alleviating the conflict in Congo was a
sufficient governmental interest to pass the Central Hudson test, the Court
held that the rule’s effects on the conflict were too speculative and could
instead have “a significant adverse effect on innocent bystanders in the
DRC.”38 At this time, the future of the Conflict Minerals rule is uncertain,
and the SEC may have to rewrite some or all of the rule, consistent with
the First Amendment.39
Uncertainty around regulations such as the Conflict Minerals Rule,
which aims at promoting social and environmental responsibility in the
corporate world, is only growing as President Trump’s administration settles into office.40 The new administration has already vowed to repeal or
replace parts of the Dodd-Frank Act.41 Whether President Trump will keep
his campaign promises — and if so, to what extent — should be worth
following.
C. The Long-Disputed GMO Labeling Law
Organic farmers and environmental groups in the United States have
pushed for a mandatory GMO labeling law for years,42 but the resulting

34
Lynnley Browning, Companies Struggle to Comply With Rules on Conflict Minerals, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015, at B1.
35
See NAM I, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
36
See NAM II, 800 F.3d 518, 520–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 526.
39
As for now, companies should still investigate and review their activities, as the European
Union is developing its own conflict minerals regulation, and the SEC rule is still valid at the moment.
See Thomas, supra note 23.
40
See Lam Bourree, Trump’s Promises to Corporate Leaders: Lower Taxes and Fewer Regulations, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/J7YT-AYNN (quoting Mr. Trump telling corporate leaders he “think[s] we can cut regulation by 75 percent, maybe more”).
41
Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2017, at A4.
42
See Chelsea Harvey, People want GMO food labeled – which is pretty much all they know
about GMOs, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 21, 2016) http://perma.cc/L2TS-9QKX.
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legislation left these activists largely unsatisfied. On July 29, 2016, President Obama signed a bill amending the Agricultural Marketing Act of
1946, requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a national disclosure standard for bioengineered foods.43 This was the result of a bitter fight
in which environmentalists and consumer groups opposed large food companies that were generally supported by Republicans. Congress finally
passed the bill with strong bipartisan support in both the Senate and the
House.44 The state of Vermont was instrumental in the passing of the bill
as the enactment of Vermont’s own stricter labeling law forced GMOfriendly legislators to reach a compromise on a federal bill.45 The Vermont
law would have required clear labeling of the presence of GMOs on labels.46 The requirement would have applied regardless of whether these
products were manufactured in Vermont or in other states,47 forcing big
food companies to either create two types of labels for their products —
one for products sold in Vermont and one for products sold elsewhere —
or simply disclose GMOs on all their products. Fearing the stigmatizing
effect from disclosing GMOs in foods,48 companies were willing to reach
a legislative compromise. President Obama signed the bill into law in July
2016, requiring disclosure of GMOs, while giving these companies freedom to make it hard for consumers to find this information.
Supporters of the new bill see the potential for a positive impact because the provision could open the door for more transparency regarding
what goes into our food.49 Given that up to 90 percent of the corn, soybeans, and cotton produced in the U.S. comes from genetically modified
seeds, the law could reach a substantial amount of products, and help educate the public about the food it consumes.50 The satisfaction of a rare
successful bipartisan compromise was short-lived, and the law has already

43

National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.) (2016).
44
See Andrea Hayley, Organic Industry at Odds Over National GMO Labeling Bill, EPOCH
TIMES (July 18, 2016) https://perma.cc/V36U-SHQ2.
45
See Dan D’Ambrosio, Obama Signs National GMO labeling law; VT Law Now Moot, Burlington Free Press (Aug. 1, 2016) https://perma.cc/BV22-3CV9.
46
The Vermont law required that a “packaged raw agricultural commodity” be labeled “with the
clear and conspicuous words ‘produced with genetic engineering.’” 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 3043(b)(1)
(2014). The law also prohibited manufacturers from labeling, advertising or indicating that food produced through genetic engineering is “’natural,’ ‘naturally made,’ or any words of similar import that
would have a tendency to mislead a consumer.” 9 VT. STAT. ANN. § 3043(c) (2014).
47
9 VT. STAT. ANN. §3043(a)(1) (2014).
48
Chris Moran, President Signs Law That Overturns Vermont GMO Labeling Rules, Replaces
Them with Barcodes, CONSUMERIST (July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/JZ7G-T84J.
49
Mark Bittman, G.M.O. Labeling Law Could Stir a Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2016, at
A19..
50
Id.
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faced strong criticism from consumer groups.51 While the law states that
companies will have to disclose the presence of GMO ingredients, it leaves
great discretion to companies over how to make this disclosure. The company can disclose the presence of GMOs in its product through text labels,
symbols, or digital links such as QR codes.52 This provision is particularly
controversial, as big food companies will likely elect to adopt QR codes,
effectively depriving low-income populations and non-tech-savvy individuals from accessing the information.53
The bill is also under attack from GMO-friendly industries, arguing
that “[t]he existence of a label disclosing GMO content, in itself, suggests
that this is a product characteristic that consumers should care about. Consequently, such labels are likely to ‘stigmatize’ GMO-containing products.”54 Because science is unsure whether the use of GMO ingredients
poses any direct health risk to consumers, GMO-friendly lobbyists argue
that mandatory labeling could actually “mislead and falsely alarm consumers.”55 Just as with the SEC Climate risks disclosure and the Conflict
Minerals rule, opponents of GMO labeling argue that the law is unconstitutional on the basis that it mandates companies to make disclosures in
violation of their First Amendment rights.
III. SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The idea itself that the First Amendment could protect a company’s
right to “conceal” information might seem counterintuitive to consumers
and investors that are not experts in the field. For example, why would a
company’s right to remain silent about the risk that climate change poses
to its business trump investors’ right to get access to critical information?
The Supreme Court has attempted to address this complex commercial
speech issue through its jurisprudence over the last four decades, sometimes reaching inconsistent results. This section contains two subsections;
the first summarizes this jurisprudence with regard to commercial speech,
and the second with regard to compelled speech. Both sections are relevant

51
Dan Charles, Congress Just Passed a GMO Labeling Bill. Nobody’s Super Happy About It,
NPR (July 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/Z2UP-QSL7.
52
Richard Fama, The New GMO Labeling Law: A matter of Perspective, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/R76V-ENCW.
53
This disclosure scheme raises discrimination issues, as one-third of adults in the United States
do not have a smartphone necessary to scan a QR code. Bittman, supra note 49; President Obama
Signs GMO ‘Non-labeling’ Bill, Leaves Millions of Americans in the Dark, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY
(July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/4G5Z-UR2V.
54
See Adler, supra note 16, at 460–61.
55
Statement by the AAS Board of Directors on Labeling of Genetically Modified Food, Am.
Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. (Oct. 20, 2012) https://perma.cc/W4W7-D85H [hereinafter AAAS
STATEMENT].
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to the sustainability disclosure requirements, as they are necessary to understand the tension between mandated disclosures and freedom of speech.
Although disclosure requirements analyzed in this article seem to better fit
the “compelled speech” area, the Central Hudson test56 remains important
as, due to the confusion engendered by the Supreme Court in compelled
speech cases, Central Hudson ends up governing many of these issues.
A. The Recognition of Commercial Speech as Protected Speech
For a long time, the government could freely regulate purely commercial advertisement,57 and the Supreme Court did not start scrutinizing
commercial speech restrictions until Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.58 In this case, a Virginia law provided that a pharmacist was guilty of unprofessional conduct by publishing, advertising or promoting, “directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms,
for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.”59 Writing for
the majority, Justice Blackmun asked whether speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction” is so removed from any “exposition of ideas” and from “truth, science, morality, and arts in general,” that
it lacks all protection.60 The Court concluded that such speech did not lack
all protection, recognizing that individual consumers and society in general have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.61 In
a paragraph that seems to strongly support the type of disclosures analyzed
in this article, Justice Blackmun wrote:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem,
is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing
and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long
as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those

56

447 U.S. 557 (1980).
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding although states and municipalities
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decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.62

Although the Court also recognized that the state had a strong interest
in making sure that pharmacists are held to high professional standards,
the Court held that the close ethical regulations to which pharmacists in
Virginia are subject to were sufficient to guarantee that interest.63 This decision established that commercial speech enjoyed constitutional protection. But, the Court failed to articulate a clear test to scrutinize governmental regulations affecting this kind of speech.
Four years later, the Court established a test to determine whether
commercial speech regulations were permissible in Central Hudson Gas
v. Public Service Commission.64 In this case, the Court considered whether
a regulation completely banning promotional advertising by an electrical
utility violated the First Amendment.65 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, established a four-part test to analyze the constitutionality of governmental regulations on commercial speech. First, the government may
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity.66 Accordingly, to
rely on First Amendment protection, the activity in question must be legal.
If the government decides to restrict commercial speech regarding illegal
activities, the First Amendment would not apply. Second, assuming the
government is regulating an otherwise legal activity, the government must
assert a substantial interest.67 Third, the interest must be directly achieved
by the restrictions on commercial speech.68 Fourth, the regulatory technique must be no more than is necessary to further that interest.69
In Central Hudson, since the regulated activity, the distribution of
electricity, was legal,70 the Court turned to the second question: analyzing
the state interest in energy conservation.71 The Court concluded that “[i]n
view of our country’s dependence on energy resources beyond our control,
no one can doubt the importance of energy conservation.”72 The State’s
62
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Id. at 563–64.
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Id. at 564.
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interest in regulating electricity advertisement was, thus, substantial. On
the third prong, the Court concluded that, although the link between fair
and efficient rates and electricity advertising was tenuous at best, there
was an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity, meaning that the regulation passed the third inquiry.73 However,
the regulation failed on the last prong because the law banned all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact on overall energy use, thereby
exceeding the regulatory capacity necessary to further the interest of energy conservation.74 This substantial interest could not justify suppressing
information about devices and services that would cause no net increase
in energy or even reduce energy consumption, so the Court held the regulation unconstitutional.75
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions merely qualified the four-part
test. In Board of Trustees v. Fox,76 the Court clarified that the “no more
extensive than necessary” requirement did not mean that the state had to
use the least restrictive alternative.77 It must be a fit “that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable.”78
B. Compelled Speech Jurisprudence
Certain types of compelled commercial speech fall under a rational
basis standard of review, which is a lower level of scrutiny than the Central Hudson Test. Under this approach, the government need only demonstrate a legitimate interest and a rational connection between that interest
and the means used to achieve it.79 Only a few cases have applied this
standard in the context of compelled commercial speech, including the recent D.C. Circuit decision regarding country-of-origin labeling on meat
products.80
1. Applying rational basis to compelled commercial speech
The rational basis test in the context of compelled commercial speech
comes from the Supreme Court case Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,81 where a state law required attorneys
to disclose in advertisements that clients may still be liable for costs if their

73

Id. at 569.
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cases were unsuccessful. The Court explained that a state may require advertisers to disclose specific information if such requirement is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”82
Under the Zauderer test, courts should be more favorable to government’s intrusions on commercial speech when such intrusions are aimed
at compelling speech rather than restricting speech. Factual disclosures
can even serve First Amendment value by promoting the exchange of
ideas. In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes insisted on the concept
of the First Amendment protecting a “marketplace of ideas.”83 Laws mandating factual disclosures inject more information into the marketplace of
ideas and further First Amendment goals.84
However, the Supreme Court’s language in the case created four potential limits to the application of Zauderer, which opponents of compelled
commercial speech were quick to seize on. First, because of the specific
context of the case — compelling lawyers to disclose costs of representation — later decisions interpreted Zauderer as limiting the rational basis
scrutiny to regulations aimed at preventing consumer deception.85 Second,
because the regulation at stake in Zauderer affected advertising or product
labeling at the point of sale, scholars and some lower courts have assumed
that this was another limit to the application of rational basis in compelled
commercial speech cases.86 Third, Justice White, writing for the majority,
noted that the regulation only compelled the advertisement of “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services will be available.”87 Fourth, the Court acknowledged that “unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”88 By using abstract
concepts, such as “unduly burdensome,” or “uncontroversial,” that it failed
to define, the Supreme Court created considerable confusion around the
standard to apply to compelled commercial speech cases.89
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The Supreme Court applied the same test in Milavetz Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States,
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2. Compelled commercial speech jurisprudence after Zauderer
The Supreme Court only considered the issue of compelled commercial speech one other time, in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States.90 Although the Court could have refined the test to apply to compelled commercial speech, the facts of the case were so similar to Zauderer
that the Court did not bother addressing the issue in its opinion.91 Rather,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that required debt
relief agencies to disclose the nature of their services. The Court simply
applied the Zauderer rational basis standard to similar facts.92
Two questions left open in the Zauderer case have engendered most
of the confusion with regard to the compelled commercial speech test. The
first question is whether the rational basis test articulated in Zauderer only
applies to mandated disclosures aiming at preventing consumer deception.
The second question left open by the Court is whether the rational basis
test only applies to disclosures of “purely factual and uncontroversial” information, and what this standard means. The D.C. Circuit’s back-andforth with regard to the test illustrates this confusion.
When reviewing the Conflict Minerals rule in 2014, a D.C. Circuit
panel first took the stance that the reduced level of scrutiny used in Zauderer only applies where the disclosure prevents consumer deception.93
Shortly after this decision, however, another D.C. Circuit panel considered
whether a congressional mandate to place country-of-origin labeling on
meat products violated the First Amendment.94 In AMI, the panel took a
strikingly different position, observing that “First Amendment interests
implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those
at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”95 The Court concluded that
“Zauderer’s characterization of the speaker’s interest in opposing forced
disclosure of such information as ‘minimal’ seems inherently applicable
beyond the problem of deception,”96 thus expressly overruling NAM I.97
On rehearing, the three-judge panel that decided NAM I still concluded that the Conflict Minerals rule violated the First Amendment. Not
being able to rely on the “limited to prevent consumer deception” reasoning, the panel used other language of Zauderer to reach its conclusion,
holding that the lower level of scrutiny only comes into play when the
90
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government regulation impacts advertising or product labeling.98 Since the
Conflict Minerals rule compelled speech on a company’s website or annual report, the court concluded that the case was outside the scope of
Zauderer and applied Central Hudson.99 The decision in NAM II100 also
illustrates the confusion around the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
aspect of the Zauderer decision. Trying to make sense of this possible limitation, the court explained that,
[i]t is also the case that propositions once regarded as factual and uncontroversial may turn out to be something quite different. What time
frame should a court use in assessing this? At the time of enactment
of the disclosure statute? At the time of an agency’s rulemaking implementing the disclosure statute? Or at some later time when the
compelled disclosures are no longer considered ‘purely factual’ or
when the disclosures have become ‘controversial’?101

The paragraph highlights one of the main issues with the “purely factual and uncontroversial” provision: the Supreme Court provided no guidance as to the timing applicable to the analysis and failed to define the
meaning of “uncontroversial.”
The Tobacco Control Act102 of 2009 provides another illustration of
the confusion in Zauderer. Under this act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published a June 2011 final ruling requiring colored graphic
warnings on the front and back of each cigarette package sold in the U.S.
and on advertisements.103 Tobacco companies challenged that rule in the
D.C. Circuit, and the court struck down the rule under the Central Hudson
test.104 The court specifically refused to apply Zauderer because the government failed to affirmatively demonstrate that advertisements regulated
by the law threatened to deceive customers.105 Acknowledging that the
governmental goal of reducing smoking may be a substantial interest, the
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court nevertheless found that the rule violated the First Amendment because the FDA failed to show that the graphic warning rule would directly
advance this interest.106
In the Sixth Circuit, the Tobacco rule had a different fate. In Discount
Tobacco, the court found that the rule addressed the public’s understanding of the health risks of smoking, thus preventing tobacco companies
from being deceptive.107 Although the court framed the inquiry under a
“preventing consumer deception” rationale to apply the lower level of
scrutiny from Zauderer,108 the underlying reasoning may have been that
Zauderer could be applicable in other situations like when the government
is trying to reduce the public’s exposure to health risks.109 This would be a
reasonable assumption as the rule was directly promoting public health by
warning consumers of the risks associated with smoking.
IV. EMPOWERING CONSUMERS AND INVESTORS BY DISCLOSING “BAD
PRACTICES”
The move toward a sustainable economy requires more incentives for
companies to move in the same direction. Governmental incentives are
one way to encourage companies,110 but the main driving force remains
consumers’ and investors’ demand for more sustainable or “cleaner” products.111 Some information is already available to consumers and investors
at the point of sale using labeling such as “USDA organic” or “fair
trade.”112 This type of labeling informs consumers and investors about
“good practices” employed by product manufacturers. Although such disclosures do have a positive impact on part of the consumer population,113
disclosing “bad practices” is a better way to empower consumers and investors in the everyday choices they make on the market.
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A. Illustration by the Vegetarian Movement
The vegetarian and vegan movements provide a good illustration of
the impact of disclosing “bad practices” on consumer decision making.
Although these movements have been around for a long time—especially
the vegetarian movement—the percentage of the U.S. population following a vegetarian diet has increased dramatically in the last five years, as
more information is available to consumers about the negative impact of
animal farming on the environment, on health, and on the economy. 114
Mandated disclosures would also change consumers and investors’ behavior by promoting the availability of information.
1. The significant economic and environmental benefits of the vegetarian movement
Consumers are realizing that choices made about the food they eat
affect their health and impacts the environment.115 Food production causes
a quarter of all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, of which 80% come
from livestock production.116 Consequently, something as simple as
changing diet may be more effective than technological mitigation options
for avoiding climate change.117
Changing diet would also prove valuable for the economy. Analyzing
the effect of food diet on the economy, a study determined annual savings
in 2050 for three different scenarios.118 The study concluded that if the
U.S. population followed dietary recommendations (less red meat, more
plant-based products), such a change would save $150 billion in direct
health-care savings, $28.1 billion in indirect health-care savings, and
$18.1 billion in environmental savings.119 These numbers increase if everyone went vegetarian: $187 billion in direct health-care savings, $36.4
billion in indirect health-care savings, and $35 billion in environmental
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savings, for a total of $258 billion worth of savings.120 The numbers increase even more for a vegan diet.121
2. A key component to the growth of vegetarianism: consumer access
to information
In 2009, only one percent of the U.S. population reported following
a vegetarian or vegan diet. In 2014, an impressive 5% (for a total of 16
million people) of the population reportedly followed a vegetarian diet,
and half of those people followed a vegan diet.122 These numbers do not
even consider the percentage of the population that decreased their meat
consumption in the last five years, or completely stopped eating beef.123
One might ask why these movements gained such popularity over the
last few years. The campaign aimed at educating consumers about the impact farming meat has on the environment and health appears to be the
main factor driving this trend.124 Approximately 42% of the population
that does not eat animal products say they made that choice after they saw
an educational film highlighting the negative impacts of the meat industry.125 The availability of information highlighting the negative effects of
meat eating, as well the increasing number of studies analyzing the impact
of cattle farming on the environment or health has been a fundamental
factor in the vegetarian trend that the U.S. has been experiencing over the
last few years.126
The correlation between the increase in percentage of vegetarians in
the country and the growing access to the information about “bad practices” is clear. When consumers are aware of the negative impact of meat-

120

Id.
With a vegan diet, these numbers reach 208 billion in direct health-care savings, 40 billion in
indirect savings, and 40 billion in environmental savings. Id.
122
See Nadine Watters, 16 Million People in the US Are Now Vegan or Vegetarian, THE RAW
FOOD WORLD, https://perma.cc/VE3X-BA9M.
123
The Department of Agriculture estimated that meat consumption in the U.S. was 12.2 percent
lower in 2012 than in 2007. See Mark Bittman, We’re Eating Less Meat. Why?, N.Y TIMES: OPINION
PAGES (Jan. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/W44Z-DWT4.
124
Sixty-nine percent of people asked why they do not eat animal products say they chose to eat
a vegan diet to support the ethical treatment of animals. See Watters, supra note 122.
125
Id.
126
In a popular documentary, “Cowspiracy,” filmmaker Kip Andersen investigated the animal
agriculture industry, showing how this industry is the “leading cause of deforestation, water consumption and pollution, is responsible for more greenhouse gases than the transportation industry, and is a
primary driver of rainforest destruction, species extinction, habitat loss, topsoil erosion, ocean ‘dead
zones,’ and virtually every other environmental ill.” See About the Film, COWSPIRACY: THE
SUSTAINABILITY SECRET, https://perma.cc/4XK6-7VHB. Although this picture might seem exaggerated, it does reflect the negative environmental impacts behind the animal agriculture industry. See
Food and Agric. Org., Livestock Policy Brief 03: Cattle Ranching and Deforestation 2 (2006).
121

84

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 8:1

heavy diets on their health or the environment, they feel a sense of responsibility and make choices that better align with a healthy lifestyle. This
process—empowering consumers by providing the necessary information
to choose between products—must expand to other sectors of the economy.
B. Empowering Consumers and Investors
Of little surprise, disclosing “bad practices” can have a more rapid
and larger impact on consumers’ and investor’s choices. Picture a consumer walking into a store to buy a product; she must decide between two
versions of the same product, one of them labeled “fair trade,” the other
having no specific information. A consumer sympathetic to the “fair trade”
label may pick the first product and overlook the potential surplus in cost
associated with it. However, the relative impact of a “fair trade” label will
depend on the consumer’s or investor’s knowledge about the meaning of
the label and the level of concern associated with it. Picture the same consumer trying to choose between two similar products; one has no specific
message on it, while the other contains a message, “this product was manufactured using child labor.” Consumers would probably choose not to buy
the latter product. Of course, this is an extreme example, as we are a long
way from requiring such labels on products. This example simply illustrates a point: disclosing “bad practices” used to manufacture a product
plays an important role in educating the population about the choices they
make when purchasing goods or investing in a company.
Some companies fear that disclosing bad practices may effectively
act as a ban on practices or content. On the other hand, such sustainabilityrelated disclosures generally aim at promoting the health and safety of the
public. Should we allow companies to hide practices that endanger local
communities in the name of profit and the companies’ freedom of speech?
To the contrary, health and environmental concerns should trump companies’ rights in this context.
The vegetarian movement is a good example of the positive impact
of disclosing bad practices; it is growing because more food consumers
become aware of the negative impact of livestock on the environment,
health, animal welfare, and the economy. The same scheme could provide
similar results in many other industries. By providing consumers and investors with the information necessary to understand the impact of a company on the community or the environment, such consumers and investors
must now consider this impact when choosing to buy or invest in a product. The conflict minerals provision of the Dodd-Frank Act is a subtler
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example of the practice aimed at empowering investors.127 The law orders
companies that are unable to prove that minerals used in their chain of
supply are “DRC conflict free” to disclose such information on their website. Investors must decide if they will support a company that might be
instrumental in financing acts of war.128 With the SEC climate risk disclosures, companies must investigate and report on how climate change will
impact their business. Investors looking at the climate risk disclosures of
a company can use that information to make responsible choices.129 The
more information consumers and investors have when making choices
about products to purchase or companies to invest in, the more impact
these consumers and investors can have on the economy. 130 More importantly, consumers can become aware of the impact of their choices.131
Of course, some regulation is necessary. Bombarding consumers and
investors with information can become overbearing on companies that are
forced to disclose information. It may also overwhelm the consumers and
investors who still need to be able to make sense of the information available.132 A simplification of the constitutional test applied to compelled
commercial speech regulations would balance the interests of industries
and consumers. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence about compelled commercial speech is confusing to say the least.133
Some courts believe that compelled commercial speech aimed at preventing consumer deception should apply the rational basis scrutiny from Zauderer, and other regulations should apply the classic Central Hudson test.
The Supreme Court should resolve these problems by applying a uniform
rational basis test to compelled commercial speech.
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V. TOWARD A BRIGHTER FUTURE: COMMERCIAL SPEECH SHOULD NOT
BE A HINDRANCE TO SUSTAINABILITY.
Much of the argument coming from lobbyists opposing disclosure
requirements relies on the idea that the consumers’ right to know is not a
sufficient interest justifying an attack on freedom of speech.134 However,
this argument does not really depict the conflict at stake. Freedom of
speech does not enjoy as much protection in the context of commercial
speech as in the context of political speech.135 Justice Blackmun’s vision
in Virginia Board of Pharmacy136 should resonate in this context. In his
opinion, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that in a predominantly free enterprise economy like the U.S., the allocation of resources in large measure
is made through numerous private economic decisions.137 As such, “it is a
matter of public interest that those decisions be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”138 Adapting his view to the pursuit of a more sustainable economy,
one could argue that the future of our environment depends largely on decisions made privately by industries that dominate their markets. To make
decision-makers accountable and to empower consumers and investors, it
is essential to disclose the impact of manufacturing goods or producing
types of food, so that those decisions be intelligent and well informed. In
this section, I first reject the industries’ legal argument that the government’s interest at stake is simply a consumer’s right to know, which is
insufficient to justify compelled disclosures. Second, I advocate for a simpler, more permissible constitutional test to scrutinize government regulations aimed at compelling commercial disclosures. Finally, I discuss the
impact that the new administration could have on governmental regulations aimed at compelling sustainability-related disclosures such as the
ones discussed in this article.
A. Rejecting the Industries’ Legal Argument
When analyzing mandated disclosures, opponents of such measures
typically rely on the tension between consumers’ “right to know” and companies’ freedom of speech.139 Jonathan Adler, defending the view that
134
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mandated disclosures should always be required to meet the Central Hudson test, presents four reasons why “the assertion of a consumer right to
know, unconnected to a more substantial governmental interest, cannot be
sufficient to compel commercial speech.”140 He starts by noting that a right
to know is a rationale potentially without discernible limits, such that there
would be “no end to the disclosures that can be mandated.”141 Adler then
argues that calls for disclosure of information on the basis of the right to
know come from subjective, normative claims, and not from a neutral
viewpoint.142 Such disclosures, he continues, give voice to politically determined issues that may stigmatize some sellers.143 Finally, he points out
that the right to know facilitates government intrusion into what are, in
fact, political questions that infringe on the core values that the First
Amendment protects.144 Although some of the concerns that Adler raises
are valid, he relies on flawed reasoning and fails to truly take into account
the full purpose served by sustainability-related disclosures. Specifically,
Adler’s characterizations of the government interest at stake, and of the
“political” character of disclosures, seem simplistic.
First, sustainability-related, mandated disclosures do not only serve
the consumers’ “right to know,” but more importantly serve the purpose of
protecting future generations from the impact of climate change by educating consumers, investors, and industries. As such, most sustainabilityrelated mandated disclosures should meet the first part of the Central Hudson test as a “substantial governmental interest.” By limiting the role of
disclosure to simply informing consumers, Adler devalues the role and
purpose served by such disclosures. Adler is correct that the right to know
could potentially be unlimited because consumers are “interested in a nearinfinite range of product and process characteristics.”145 His concern that
the government should not be able to justify serious intrusion on freedom
of speech based solely on this interest is also valid. However, the reality is
that the government interest at stake is often more important than an individual’s “right to know.”
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Adler’s second and fourth arguments advance the same theme. He
argues that information consumers seek often depends on what is important to them, the right to know is highly subjective and sometimes
brings into the mix political questions that are at the core of the First
Amendment.146 In the context of sustainability-related mandated disclosures, this argument is flawed. Adler argues that disclosures such as the
ones covered in this article lack neutrality.147 But such an argument relies
on the idea that compelled disclosures are, for all practical purposes, requirements that commercial actors communicate value-laden messages
about inherently political questions, such as how products should be made,
animals should be treated and so on.148 However, the type of disclosures
at issue are not inherently political. SEC climate risk disclosures or the
conflict minerals rule come from a broader concern for climate change and
sustainability. Climate change is not political, it is a science.149 It is a factual, scientifically proven phenomenon that does not present the subjective
and political characteristics that Adler contends.150
Finally, Adler argues that compelled disclosures can become a requirement that a producer or seller potentially stigmatize their own product, saying to consumers “think about it before you buy this product because of the following fact or characteristic about which you were previously unaware.”151 But this is precisely the point of compelled disclosures,
to inform consumers and investors about the negative impact of a product
so they are able to make meaningful decisions. Rather than stigmatizing
consumers or producers, compelled disclosures are aimed at encouraging
the transition toward more sustainable practices to protect future generations. Take the example of a “carbon cost” disclosure that would require
producers and sellers to disclose on the label of their products the amount
146
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of emissions one product is responsible for. Such a measure would not
create a stigma, but rather would educate the consumer about the impact
of one product compared to another. While Adler sees compelled disclosures as a stigmatizing phenomenon, thus privileging the status quo, compelled disclosures can be viewed from another angle, as a tool to empower
producers, sellers, consumers, and investors.
Of course, regulators could simply ban GMOs or conflict minerals
from the chain of supply, or better regulate what could be harmful to the
population of the environment but there are at least two issues with this
approach. First, political opposition would likely prevent any ban from
going through the legislative process.152 Second, relying on regulators to
empower consumers and investors and give them the tools to influence the
market might be ill-advised. An important perk of mandated disclosures is
to give consumers the information they need to make a choice. Relying on
regulators would not empower consumers and investors to the same extent.
Opponents of disclosure requirements argue that the intermediate
scrutiny of Central Hudson is “unlikely to prevent agencies and regulators
from safeguarding public health or market efficiency.”153 This is true to an
extent. Warning consumers of the direct health effects of a product will
undoubtedly clear the “substantial interest” standard of Central Hudson.
However, under current jurisprudence, it would fail to capture sustainability-related compelled disclosures that, rather than warning consumers
about direct health effect, are indirectly aimed at protecting the planet and
future generations.154
B. Rehabilitating Disclosure Requirements with the Constitution
The current Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding compelled commercial speech is largely unsatisfying and needs clarification. As mentioned above, there is currently great confusion as to whether the Zauderer
rational basis standard is limited to disclosures aimed at preventing consumer deception. Because of this confusion, courts have applied the Central Hudson test to some cases involving compelled commercial speech
that may not have to do with preventing consumer deception.
The Supreme Court should resolve the confusion resulting from the
Zauderer case in favor of a rational basis test in the compelled commercial
speech context. Before diving into the issues with the presumed limitations
152
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of the Zauderer reasoning, one must understand why the sustainabilityrelated disclosure requirements discussed in this article would not clear
the Central Hudson test. Most disclosure requirements constitute a substantial governmental interest, meeting the first hurdle of the Central Hudson test. The issue emerges on the degree of relation between the means
used and the interest protected. Under Central Hudson, the interest must
be directly achieved by the regulation affecting free speech.
Although the protection of future generations is arguably a substantial governmental interest, the idea that such interest would be directly
achieved by compelled disclosures of climate risks or conflict minerals is
a far stretch. It would be more accurate to describe this relationship as
indirect; the disclosures empower consumers and investors to make
choices that, in turn, influence companies to adopt more sustainable practices that promote the interest of future generations. As such, these disclosure requirements may not pass the Central Hudson test, which requires
using means substantially related to an important governmental interest.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should revisit the Zauderer decision in
order to eliminate the presumed limitations on the scope of the case.
1. The limits of the Zauderer decision
The idea that Zauderer only applies to regulations aimed at preventing consumer deception simply does not make sense. Preventing consumer
deception would most likely clear the higher “substantial interest” bar of
the Central Hudson test. Accordingly, the rational basis test set out in Zauderer would be completely unnecessary if it was limited to such instances.
Maybe the higher level of scrutiny is imposed to require a more direct relationship between the regulation and the governmental interest, but nowhere did the Court indicate such a purpose. The type of regulation the
Supreme Court considered in both cases having to do with compelled commercial speech happened to be in the context of a regulation preventing
consumer deception. But this limit appeared to be more coincidental than
voluntary. There is no language in Zauderer expressly limiting the scope
of the analysis to this type of regulation.155
Additionally, “preventing consumer deception” is a difficult concept to define. For example, the D.C. Circuit upheld the country-of-origin
labeling requirement on meat products under the Zauderer test when the
governmental interest was protecting consumers’ right to buy U.S.-made

155
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meat.156 However, one could argue that the provision is indirectly aimed
at preventing consumer deception. Providing information about the country-of-origin allows consumers to specifically pick locally-raised meat. In
the absence of the country-of-origin label, a consumer might buy meat assuming that it was local, only to later find out the real origin. Most, if not
all, of the types of disclosures discussed in this article are related in one
way or another to preventing consumer deception by giving them access
to information. This information allows consumers to knowingly choose
the product that corresponds best to their needs, a choice they would otherwise not be able to make. As such, limiting Zauderer to instances of
consumer deception does not make any sense.
The Court in Zauderer also did not expressly limit the application of
the lower scrutiny standard to “purely factual and uncontroversial” information.157 The problem with the “uncontroversial” provision of Zauderer
is that it potentially has the effect of opening a Pandora’s box. With impressive financial means and political ties, it is easy for big industries to
“create” controversies around any type of information they would be required to disclose in the future.158 GMO labeling is a perfect example. On
its face, whether GMOs are present in a product is purely factual and uncontroversial. Either the product contains GMOs or it does not. However,
the opposition between GMO-friendly industries and consumer groups has
made the topic highly political,159 and thus “controversial.” The ability to
make a topic “controversial” is potentially unlimited. Therefore, the Supreme Court should make it clear that the lower level of scrutiny set out in
Zauderer is not so limited to “purely factual and uncontroversial” information.160
Third, the notion coming from NAM II that Zauderer application only
applies to disclosure requirements imposed at the point of sale or in advertisements is similarly ill-advised. Nowhere in Zauderer is “point of sale”
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mentioned,161 and there are at least two issues with this limitation. First,
investors and consumers today find a lot of information about products on
companies’ websites. NAM II argued that the conflict minerals rule was
outside the scope of Zauderer because the information needed to appear
on companies’ websites rather than at the point of sale or on advertisements.162 However, for many companies, their websites constitute their
point of sale; this is where investors get access to at least some of the information that will influence the choice to invest in a given company. Additionally, more and more sales happen online.163 As consumers or investors spend time online, they are targeted by ads from different companies
leading them straight to these companies’ website where they can then
purchase products.164 The growth of e-commerce manifests itself through
giants like Amazon and Ebay, but is now also growing for grocery sales.165
This current trend has made the distinction between point of sale and websites largely irrelevant.
2. A resolution to the confusion in favor of compelled disclosures
The Supreme Court should revisit Zauderer to clarify that rational
basis applies when analyzing whether compelled commercial speech violates the First Amendment. Such a test would reconcile disclosure requirements like the GMO labeling law, the SEC climate risk guidance, and the
conflict minerals rule with the Constitution. To avoid potential abuses resulting from governmental intrusion on free speech, the Court could also
retain one aspect of the Zauderer decision, “that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by
chilling protected commercial speech.”166 The Supreme Court, to create an
additional safeguard for companies’ freedom of speech, could define what
“unduly burdensome” means, offering companies the opportunity to rebut
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the government’s rational basis argument by showing how a disclosure
requirement unduly burdens them.
Consider a governmental regulation mandating the disclosure of the
minimum wage applied by companies to their entry-level workers. To pass
the rational basis test, the government would first argue that improving the
quality of life of U.S. citizens and promoting a sustainable job market are
legitimate state interests. By forcing companies to disclose the minimum
wage applied, the regulation gives investors and consumers a chance to
make informed decisions when purchasing a product. Because these consumers now better understand why two similar products may have different prices, they may choose to spend more money to validate the good
practices that the government is seeking to promote. Such a regulation
should pass the rational basis test because it advances a legitimate governmental interest and the regulation is rationally related to that interest.
The issue with such a regulation is that certain companies and industries will be hit harder than others, not because they chose to pay their
employees lower wages, but rather because some industries thrive on margins between cost of production and sale price that are so slim that raising
wages would destroy them. The “unduly burdensome” defense would allow an industry to fight the regulation and force the government to take
into account special circumstances in the text of the law to avoid unfair or
“unduly burdensome” results. Then, the rational basis test, although easier
to clear, would still protect companies from overbroad government regulations.
The rational basis would offer more judicial certainty with regard to
compelled commercial speech and allow the government to empower consumers and investors to choose a more sustainable future. The test also
aims at striking the right balance: protecting companies’ constitutional interests while promoting the circulation of information on the market to
empower consumers and investors to choose a sustainable future. As
shown above, the main issue with the Central Hudson test is that it places
a high bar by requiring a close relation between the government’s interests
and the way the government promotes it. The rational basis standard provides more freedom to promote a more sustainable economy with the use
of mandated disclosures. The “unduly burdensome” defense should shield
companies from excessive government intrusion by giving courts the discretion to strike down a regulation excessively intruding on freedom of
speech.
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C. New Uncertainty: President Trump’s Administration
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States increased the uncertainty surrounding governmental regulations as they apply to compelled disclosures. President Trump has been very clear that he
would target governmental regulations, repeating that “[e]xcessive regulation is killing jobs, driving companies out of our country like never before.”167 Since he took office, Trump also made clear that environmentrelated regulations would be among the first targets of his great regulatory
rollback,168 a sentiment reinforced by his announcement that the U.S.
would withdraw from the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement.169 It
seems unlikely that President Trump’s administration will enact new regulations aimed at compelling disclosures of information promoting sustainability. As to regulations already in place, their future is seriously jeopardized.
The Conflict Minerals rule was the topic of a draft executive order as
early as February 2017, in which President Trump proposed a two-year
suspension of a portion of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires U.S. companies to carry out due diligence to ensure that their products do not contain
conflict minerals.170 Although the draft has not been signed into law, it
remains likely that the rule will be affected in the future as part of a broader
effort to undermine the Dodd-Frank Act.171
The implementation of the GMO labeling law is also likely to slow
down or come to a stop. Although President Obama signed the GMO bill
into law in July 2016, the USDA still had to draft regulations governing
the disclosure of GMOs.172 However, President Trump signed an executive order cracking down on federal regulations, requiring federal agencies
to eliminate two regulations before one new regulation can be implemented.173 Although the GMO labeling law itself should remain intact, it
is hard to see how it could be executed under Trump’s executive order.
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As to SEC climate risk disclosures, it is not clear where the new administration stands. Trump’s pick for SEC chair, Jay Clayton, said that
companies should disclose climate-related risks.174 Clayton’s stance is
hard to reconcile with the administration’s refusal to treat climate change
as a priority.175 Climate risk disclosures could experience a better fate than
the Conflict Minerals rule and the GMO labeling regulations under
Trump’s presidency for two reasons. First, companies would generally
benefit from such disclosures. Investigating climate risk exposure would
incentivize companies to build up their climate resilience and be better
equipped to face the challenges that they will face due to climate change.176
Second, companies do not need the government’s help or approval to conduct these studies and disclose climate risks.177
The full effect the new administration will have on compelled disclosure will not be immediately clear, but President Trump’s first executive
orders strongly indicate that sustainability and climate resilience are not
among his priorities. If anything, his election should create a new sense of
responsibility for consumers, investors, and companies to take matters into
their own hands and do what the government will not do.
VI. CONCLUSION
Consumers and investors are becoming increasingly interested in the
characteristics of a product: the type of components used, the process being used, the working conditions of the people manufacturing a product,
whether the product is local, and the carbon footprint of a product. Investors keep pushing for increased climate risk disclosures from the SEC, 178
while the GMO labeling law came in part from a strong interest from the
population to know whether products contain GMOs. Efforts from investors and consumers will be even more important in light of the new administration’s opposition to compelled disclosures. They not only face political hurdles, but also judicial challenges. The issue is ripe for the Supreme
Court to consider and clarify. The Court should not lack opportunities to
do so: the Tobacco Control Act, the GMO-labeling law, or new SEC climate risks disclosures could all provide a chance for the highest court to
consider compelled commercial speech. When doing so, the Court should
use caution when determining which standard to apply when analyzing the
174
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constitutionality of governmental regulations compelling commercial
speech.
As the AMI opinion from the D.C. Circuit suggested, “First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially
weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”179 Sustainability-related disclosure requirements are necessary to empower consumers and investors to choose a sustainable future and protect future generations. Big industries opposing the transition to a more sustainable economy should not be allowed to use the First Amendment as a shield to shy
away from their responsibility. At the same time, there needs to be some
level of protection to limit governmental intrusion and safeguard the interest of some industries that could become overly burdened by disclosure
requirements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should adopt a rational basis test in the context of compelled commercial speech with a safeguard
allowing regulated entities to show how a disclosure regulation unduly
burdens their free speech. This solution would clarify the confusion caused
by the Zauderer decision, and would adequately promote a sustainable
economy by empowering consumers and investors to send a strong signal
to industries, while safeguarding companies’ First Amendment interests.
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